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Abstract 
‘Organised solidarity’ of a mediated legal form constitutes the backbone of the 
modern welfare state built on solidarity between strangers. The interplay between 
the single market and the national social systems is key in defining who owes what to 
whom under the ‘transnationalised’ European solidarity. Free movement rights have 
increased the ‘entanglement’ of national social systems’ revenue and expenditure 
sides, considered to jeopardise their steering capacity. As a corollary to free 
movement, transnational solidarity does not take place beyond or between national 
welfare states, but rather within: as solidarity with strangers. Here transnational 
solidarity is applied by way of a sociological framework to trace the evolutionary path 
of free movement of persons as it fluctuates between ‘commodification’ and 
‘decommodification’. Against that backdrop, this article reviews whether a paradigm 
shift is currently promoted as to the question where solidarity with strangers begins 
and ends. 
 
Introduction 
 
The principles of the single market superseded the institutional compromise between ‘capital’ and 
‘labour’, which was constitutive for the development of welfare capitalism in the postwar era. By 
furthering the mobility of the production factors of capital and labour, economic freedoms also 
changed the balance of power between more or less mobile social groups.1 Free movement rights 
have increased the ‘entanglement’ of national social systems and may eventually put in jeopardy 
their steering capacity. Whereas the free movement of capital may restrict the fiscal sovereignty 
of the Member States, or their control of the revenue side, the free movement of persons may 
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compromise the financial sustainability of welfare systems, or control of the expenditure side. In 
both areas of law, the question is thus under what conditions Member States may invoke 
economic reasons to restrict individual rights to free movement.2 
In this article, our focus is on the free movement of persons, which can be understood in terms of 
the ‘transnationalisation’ of solidarity. The specific type of solidarity that we are concerned with is 
’solidarity between nationals and migrants‘,3 or between static national citizens and mobile EU 
citizens. Since the introduction of free movement of factors of production, and the first efforts at 
removing obstacles to them, EU law has modified the rules of membership in national social 
systems, which grant access to organised solidarity and which define who owes what to whom. 
Our aim is to clarify the conditions of this transnational ‘solidarity with strangers’ and its 
implications for national welfare systems. 
Proceeding from a sociological framework, the article first outlines the concept of transnational 
solidarity, which guides our analysis. This is followed by an overview of the development of Union 
citizenship law in terms of the ‘commodification’ or ‘decommodification’ of free movement rights. 
Next, we turn to an analysis of the economic arguments that have been put forward in favour or 
against the expansion of free movement rights with regard to workers and so-called ‘economically 
non-actives’.4 Finally, we speculate on the future development of this area of law. It is suggested 
that the debate preceding and following the Brexit referendum may promote a paradigm shift 
with regard to the rights of workers, for which economic reasoning limiting the rights of ‘non-
actives’ has paved the way. 
The free movement of persons as transnational solidarity with strangers 
The subject matter of this article is the transformation of ‘organised solidarity’, which forms the 
backbone of the modern welfare state and takes a mediated, legal form. Hence, we are less 
interested in the evolvement of feelings of solidarity, which are often the product, rather than the 
precondition, of organised solidarity,5 than in the development of individual rights and duties as 
they are posited in laws and regulations. 
The ‘Europeanisation’ of welfare capitalism entails, at least in tendency, a transformation of 
solidarity from national to transnational rights and duties. This transnationalisation of solidarity 
                                                          
2 J. Snell, J, ‘Free Movement of Capital: Evolution as a Non-Linear Process’, in P. Craig and G. de Búrca (eds) Evolution 
of EU Law, (Oxford University Press, 2n ed., 2011), 547-574, at 574. 
3 Cf. C. Barnard, ‘EU Citizenship and the Principle of Solidarity’, in M. Dougan and E. Spaventa (eds) Social Welfare and 
EU Law (Hart Publishing, 2005), 157-180, at 166. Barnard speaks of transnational solidarity only with regard to 
‘medium-term residents’, whereas we include ‘long-term residents’ and ‘new arrivals’ as well. Cf. ibid., at 166-175. 
4 See Art. 7 of Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of 
citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States 
amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 
75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC (OJ 2004 L 158, p. 77, and corrigenda at OJ 2004 L 
229, p. 35 and OJ 2005 L 197, p. 34). 
5 S. Börner, ‘From National to European Solidarity? The Negotiation of Redistributive Spaces’, in S. Börner and M. 
Eigmüller (eds) European Integration, Processes of Change and the National Experience (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 
166-188, at 176. 
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mainly proceeds through ‘negative’ integration, that is, through economic freedoms and accessory 
social rights, due to lack of competence for ‘positive’ integration through EU-level social policies.6  
The national welfare state has been characterised by an ‘abstract, legally mediated solidarity 
between strangers’,7 which distinguishes it from earlier, more concrete and personalised forms of 
solidarity. The ‘strangers’ are, in this case, citizens of the same ‘imagined’ nation, who may 
eventually develop a strong sense of community. However, ideally speaking, ‘solidarity between 
strangers’ is not premised on an ethnically homogenous national collective, or ‘a community of 
fate shaped by common descent, language and history’,8 but may also extend beyond national 
borderlines. In this process, law plays an eminent role. 
In the European context, the free movement of persons created a situation in which national 
collectives are indeed opened to ‘strangers’, which are, in this case, nationals from a different 
Member State. In Simmel’s sociology of space, the stranger is defined as the guest who stays.9 The 
prototype of a stranger, thus understood, was a trader ‘[who] settle[d] down in the place of his 
activity, instead of leaving it again’.10 Union citizenship law sets, or limits, the conditions – for 
traders and non-traders, workers and non-workers – under which ‘strangers’ may turn into 
‘members’ of national social systems.11 Accordingly, the transnationalisation of solidarity does not 
take place beyond or between national welfare states, but rather within. 
The question is where this solidarity with strangers begins and where it ends. In times of economic 
crisis, the pressure to justify transnational solidarity is particularly high. With regard to the 
adjudication of Union citizenship rights, it has been suggested that a changing economic context 
‘will have the greatest effect at the fringe rather than at the core’, which means that the rights of 
economically non-active mobile EU citizens are more delicate than the rights of mobile EU 
workers, not to mention the rights of third-country nationals who are family members of Union 
citizens.12 What we aim to show in this article is that the rights of workers are not exempt from 
economic reevaluation either. Instead, recent developments seem to indicate that a paradigm 
shift is underway. 
Union citizenship law between commodification and decommodification 
                                                          
6 On the European level, Treaty defined aspects of social policy fall within shared competence (Art. 4 TFEU). Since the 
Maastricht Treaty (1992), EU social policy provisions specifically ‘shall not affect the right of Member States to define 
the fundamental principles of their social security systems and must not significantly affect the financial equilibrium 
thereof’ (Art. 153(4) TFEU). The Lisbon Treaty (2007) made an ‘emergency brake’ available for Member States should 
a proposed EU measure on social security for workers ‘affect important aspects of its social security system, including 
its scope, cost or financial structure, or would affect the financial balance of that system’ (Art. 48(2) TFEU). 
7 J. Habermas, ‘Why Europe Needs A Constitution’, (2001) 11 New Left Review, 5-26, at 16. 
8 Ibid., at 15. 
9 A. Loycke (ed.) Der Gast, der bleibt: Dimensionen von Georg Simmels Analyse des Fremdseins (Campus, 1992). 
10 G. Simmel, ‘The Stranger’, in G. Simmel, The Sociology of Georg Simmel, ed. by Kurt H. Wolff (Free Press, 1950 
[German original published in 1908]), 402-408, at 403. 
11 Cf. M. Dougan and E. Spaventa, ‘“Wish You Weren’t Here…”: New Models of Social Solidarity in the European 
Union’, in M. Dougan and E. Spaventa (eds) Social Welfare and EU Law (Hart Publishing, 2005), 181-218, at 185-186. 
12 U. Šadl and M. R. Madsen, ‘Did the Financial Crisis Change European Citizenship Law? An Analysis of Citizenship 
Rights Adjudication Before and After the Financial Crisis’, (2016) 22 European Law Journal, 40-60, at 57. 
 4 
According to Esping-Andersen, ‘the core idea of a welfare state’ is social citizenship, that is, an 
emphasis on social rights, next to civil and political rights.13 Against the backdrop of the 
‘commodification of labour’, or the subjection of wage-setting to market forces, in the ‘market 
society’ of the nineteenth century,14 the aim of welfare capitalism, as it developed in the 
twentieth century, was ‘a de-commodification of the status of individuals vis-à-vis the market’.15 In 
this sense, social citizenship implies a (certain) decoupling of social security from individual 
performance, or even participation, in the labour market. 
The terminology of ‘commodification’ and ‘decommodification’ has occasionally been used to 
reconstruct the development of Union citizenship law.16 Since Union (social) citizenship is 
complementary to national (social) citizenship, we may expect that developments on the national 
level are reflected in similar developments on the supranational level. However, as an accessory 
status that is tied to the integration process, Union citizenship also follows a logic of its own, which 
requires some adaptations in the terminology. 
In the European context, the notions of ‘commodification’ and ‘decommodification’ are used to 
refer to the presence or relative absence of an economic rationale in furthering the free 
movement of persons and, indirectly, solidarity with strangers. Drawing on the relevant 
literature,17 but also going beyond, we will distinguish between three strands or stages of Union 
citizenship law, which we dub ‘commodification’, ‘decommodification’ and ‘recommodification’. 
Commodification: focusing on the rights of workers 
Taking the freedom of movement as ‘the core of contemporary EU citizenship’18 allows retracing 
its beginnings, or antecedents, not only to the EEC Treaty (1957) but to the ECSC Treaty (1951). 
The Article on the free movement of coal and steel workers19 was included as it was ‘the key 
condition for Italian participation’ that the Treaty facilitates export of Italy’s surplus agricultural 
                                                          
13 G. Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Polity, 1990), at 21; cf. T. H. Marshall, ‘Citizenship and 
Social Class’, in T. H. Marshall Citizenship and Social Class and Other Essays (Cambridge University Press, 1950), 1-85. 
14 K. Polanyi, The Great Transformation (Beacon Press, 1957 [1944]). 
15 Esping-Andersen, above, n. 13, at 21. 
16 Most recently by E. Hartmann, ‘European Social Policy: Social Cohesion through Competition?’, in E. Hartmann and 
P. Kjaer (eds) The Evolution of Intermediary Institutions in Europe: From Corporatism to Governance (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2015), 121-137; see also W. Streeck, ‘Competitive Solidarity: Rethinking the “European Social Model”, in K. 
Hinrichs, H. Kitschelt and H. Wiesenthal (eds), Kontingenz und Krise: Institutionenpolitik in kapitalistischen und 
postsozialistischen Gesellschaften (Campus, 2000), 245-261; J. A. Caporaso and S. Tarrow, ‘Polanyi in Brussels: 
Supranational Institutions and the Transnational Embedding of Markets’, (2009) 63 International Organization, 593-
620; S. B. Hager, ‘“New Europeans” for the “New European Economy”: Citizenship and the Lisbon Agenda’, in J. 
Drahokoupil and L. Horn (eds) Contradictions and Limits of Neoliberal European Governance (Palgrave Macmillan, 
2009), 106-124; M. Höpner and A. Schäfer, Polanyi in Brussels? Embeddedness and the Three Dimensions of European 
Economic Integration, MPIfG Discussion Paper (2010) 10/8, available at 
http://www.mpifg.de/people/mh/paper/Hoepner%202010%20-%20Polanyi%20in%20Brussels.pdf. 
17 See above, n. 16. 
18 W. Maas, ‘The Genesis of European Rights’, (2005) 43 Journal of Common Market Studies, 1009-1025, at 1010; 
reference omitted. 
19 Art. 69(1) ECSC: ’Member States undertake to remove any restriction based on nationality upon the employment in 
the coal and steel industries of workers who are nationals of Member States and have recognised qualifications in a 
coalmining or steel-making occupation, subject to the limitations imposed by the basic requirements of health and 
public policy.’ 
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labour to Belgium for work in the coal mines.20 Its ‘relatively narrow interpretation’ privileged 
particularly ‘skilled’ coal and steel workers, who alone were able to benefit from a system of 
international work permits.21 Opposition to the ECSC Treaty in national parliaments raised the 
issue of commodification, in that workers would become merchandise in the same manner as 
goods.22 
Learning from the practical failure of the Article, the EEC Treaty extended the free movement from 
workers in the coal and steel industries to workers in general. Moreover, it mentioned the 
abolition of obstacles to freedom of movement for persons as an objective, albeit only originally 
included Articles on workers and self-employed persons.23 The EEC Treaty already contained a 
general prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality, as well as specific expressions of it 
in the Articles on workers and self-employed persons as well as service providers.24 After a 
transitional period, once necessary secondary legislation existed, these privileged groups were to 
be treated no differently than nationals of the host Member State in similar situations and would 
be able to exercise their right to free movement and residence, unless this was denied on the basis 
of distinctly non-economic grounds for general derogations (public policy, public security, and 
public health grounds). 
Hence, at the outset, Treaty-based rights to free movement existed only for economically active 
Member State nationals, first of all workers. To the extent that access to social benefits was 
derived from this status, the first generation of European social rights can be considered 
‘commodified’.25 Inasmuch as the objective was to create a common market for the European 
labour force which could then be allocated between the Member States according to the logic of 
demand and supply, this label seems justified. However, the means to achieve this was the 
removal of obstacles to free movement, such as a loss of acquired social rights and advantages 
due to labour mobility. As a case in point, social insurance programmes covering the risk of lost 
earnings, e.g., in times of sickness or old age, obviously reduce the market dependence of the 
beneficiaries. In this sense, ‘decommodification’ on the national level was preserved and, 
eventually, given a European dimension. Nonetheless, the main target group of the first 
generation of European social rights were mobile workers, that is, those actively participating in 
the labour market of another Member State. 
It is in this respect that, from the present day perspective, the ‘pre-Maastricht paradigm’ as to the 
scope of application of EU law, and hence reliance on non-discrimination, has been characterised 
                                                          
20 Maas, above, n. 18, at 1012. According to Maas, the Italian Movimento Federalista Europeo around 1943 and the 
Dutch European Action group around 1948 both called for European citizenship to supplement national citizenship, 
see 1012 ff. 
21 Ibid., at 1016. 
22 Ibid., 1014-1015. 
23 See Art. 3(c) EEC and the sub-heading of Part Two, Title III, which refers to the ‘Free Movement of Persons, Services 
and Capital’. The sub-chapters refer to ‘workers’, the ‘right of establishment’, ‘services’, and ‘capital’. 
24 Art. 7(1) EEC; cf. currently Art. 18 TFEU. See also Arts 48(2) EEC (now 45 TFEU), 52(2) EEC (now 49 TFEU), and 60 EEC 
(now 56 TFEU), and as to the free movement right of service recipients: Joined cases 286/82 and 26/83 Luisi and 
Carbone, EU:C:1984:35, para. 10. 
25 Hartmann, above, n. 16, at 131. 
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as being ‘based on the purely market-oriented cross-border-logic’.26 In practice, the ‘commodified’ 
form of European solidarity, together with equally low but less concentrated mobility than today, 
complemented national solidarity, but seems to have had a minor potential to curb national social 
rights. 
Decommodification: expanding the rights of economically non-actives 
In the following decades, the Member States extended transnational solidarity to certain groups of 
economically non-active citizens whereby free movement became ‘more redistributive in 
nature.’27 Whereas in the first generation of European social rights, a central aim was to close 
possible ‘insurance gaps’ resulting from labour mobility, in the second generation the emphasis 
turned from contributory in-work benefits to non-contributory out-of-work benefits, or from 
social insurance to social assistance. For some observers, Union citizenship is inherently connected 
with this ‘decommodification’ of European social rights.28 Programmatically, this required 
developing the ‘incipient form – still embryonic and imperfect – of European citizenship’29 
enclosed in the free movement of workers in all its dimensions. 
However, the way to Union citizenship was fraught with ambiguities. On the one hand, Wiener 
finds the explicit roots of Union citizenship in the early 1970s, when emerging European 
citizenship policies and practices formed part of a project to further European identity and 
solidarity,30 and not the Common Market. On the other, according to Olsen, the market had 
already provided an implicit legal framework (free movement and non-discrimination) for 
transnational European citizenship.31 Whatever the reading of legal or political history, in the 
1980s ‘market making’ gained momentum and the economic core of European free movement 
rights was again emphasised. Commodified and decommodified visions of European citizenship 
continued to exist side-by-side. 
In the run-up to the Maastricht Treaty (1992), a Spanish initiative to the Intergovernmental 
Conference in 1990 is credited with putting forward a concept of European citizenship that would 
include economic, political, and social rights.32 In contrast to prior policy initiatives, which ‘have 
not managed to go beyond the idea of “privileged aliens”’ in the European (Economic) 
Community, this ‘full-scale European citizenship’ would amount to ‘citizenship of European 
Political Union’.33 
                                                          
26 D. Kochenov and R. Plender, ‘EU Citizenship: From an Incipient Form to an Incipient Substance? The Discovery of the 
Treaty Text’, (2012) 37 European Law Review, 369-396, at 376. 
27 Hartmann, above, n. 16, at 131. 
28 Ibid., at 132. 
29 M. L. Levi-Sandri, ‘Free Movement of Workers in the European Community’, in (1968) Vol. 1, No. 11 Bulletin of the 
European Communities, 5-9, at 6. 
30 A. Wiener, ‘From Special to Specialized Rights: The Politics of Citizenship and Identity in the European Union’, in M. 
Hanagan and C. Tilly (eds) Extending Citizenship: Reconfiguring States (Rowman and Littlefield, 1999), 195-227, at 207. 
31 E. D. H. Olsen, Transnational Citizenship in the European Union: Past, Present, and Future (Continuum, 2012), at 11. 
For a (market) rights-based view, see also W. Maas Creating European Citizens (Rowman and Littlefield, 2007). 
32 Wiener, above, n. 30, at 210-211.  
33 Spanish Memorandum ‘Towards a European Citizenship’, Council Document SN 3940/90, available at http://eudo-
citizenship.eu/policy-documents, at 329. 
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The Maastricht Treaty established a general right to free movement,34 which in turn broadened 
the scope of application of non-discrimination in terms of entitlements as well. Arguably, two 
more decades had to pass until the breakthrough of the ‘post-Maastricht paradigm’ of citizens’ 
rights became evident with Rottmann.35 As to previously commodified free movement rights, the 
post-Maastricht process made welfare benefits more accessible to other EU nationals than those 
of economically active status. However, the principle of equal treatment does not necessarily 
imply an equal upgrading of social rights for everyone, but it also allows to limit everybody’s 
entitlements in a non-discriminatory manner. Moreover, citizenship rights conferred by Article 20 
TFEU remain a residual category of rights, a protected nucleus of the status,36 whereas the Treaty-
based Union citizens’ free movement rights are offset with duties that remain economic in nature 
for both the economically active and non-active.37 In the end, extension of the scope of Union 
citizenship does not exclude a ‘recommodification’ of its substance inasmuch as social rights are 
concerned. 
Recommodification: turning from rights to duties in Union citizenship 
Creating Union citizenship has in practice meant that transnational solidarity is no longer limited 
to the technically ‘unified’ European labour force.38 However, by the time that European social 
rights had become more inclusive, the ‘Keynesian welfare state’ of the postwar era had already 
given way to a ‘Schumpeterian workfare state’.39 The turn ‘from welfare to workfare’ describes a 
reorientation of national welfare systems ‘towards work, labor-force attachment, and the 
deterrence of welfare claims’,40 or ‘activating labour market policies’. To meet this target, non-
contributory social benefits are made more conditional on individual efforts to take up and stay in 
employment. Streeck speaks of a shift from ‘protective and redistributive’ to ‘competitive and 
productive solidarity’, or a reorientation from the ‘de-commodification of individuals’ to the 
‘creation of equal opportunities for commodification’.41 
It is against this backdrop that the European conception of (social) citizenship, which came to 
complement this political agenda on the supranational level, has been marked, once again, as 
‘commodified’.42 Reference is made, first of all, to the field of unemployment policy, ‘where a 
                                                          
34 See currently Art. 21(1) TFEU and, on that it confers direct effect, Case C-413/99 Baumbast and R, EU:C:2002:493, 
para. 84. 
35 Case C-135/08 Rottmann, EU:C:2010:104. See Kochenov and Plender, above, n. 26, at 385-386. 
36 The limits of that nucleus were first considered in Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano, EU:C:2011:124, para. 42, according 
to which Art. 20 TFEU guaranteed ‘genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights’. 
37 In this sense, the ‘citizenship duty’ of economically non-actives is to comply with the (economic) conditions of 
Directive 2004/38, above, n. 4, especially Art. 7(1), before acquiring the right to permanent residence. See also N. N. 
Shuibhne, ‘Limits Rising, Duties Ascending: The Changing Legal Shape of Union Citizenship’, (2015) 52 Common Market 
Law Review, 889-938, at 901. 
38 Hartmann, above, n. 16, at 129. 
39 B. Jessop ‘Towards a Schumpeterian Workfare State? Preliminary Remarks on Post-Fordist Political Economy’, 
(1993) 40 Studies in Political Economy, 7-39. 
40 J. Peck, ‘The Rise of the Workfare State’, (2003) Kurswechsel No. 3, 75-87, at 78. 
41 Streeck, above, n. 16, at 252-253; emphasis omitted. 
42 Hager, above, n. 16, at 107; cf. C. Colliot-Thélène, ‘What Europe Does To Citizenship’, in D. Chalmers, M. 
Jachtenfuchs and C. Joerges, Christian (eds) The End of the Eurocrats’ Dream: Adjusting to European Diversity 
(Cambridge University Press, 2016), 127-145, at 140-141. 
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meaningful EU-level response, in the form of social rights, to the crisis of structural unemployment 
was cast aside in favour of promoting the citizen’s duty to become “employable” and “adaptable” 
in the face of labour market flexibility’.43 Inasmuch as Union citizenship law still contains, at its 
core, a ‘“socially-thin” [concept of] market citizenship’,44 it seems more in line with these 
activating policies than against it. At least, there is little reason to expect that the 
‘recommodification’ of national social rights could be counteracted by European legal means. 
Instead, Union citizenship law might not only complement but eventually reinforce these rights-
curbing tendencies under the premise of non-discrimination. 
In the ‘new welfare contract’,45 the focus is on economic incentives, or the behavioural conditions 
of social transfers, and not on who may enter the contract in the first place. However, economic 
reasoning also plays a role in how membership in national social systems is defined, or re-defined, 
in the European context. Attention then turns to the question of who has access to organised 
solidarity in national social systems, and to what extent. Along with the ‘universalisation of 
strangeness’ in contemporary societies,46 in which intra- and transnational mobility is a common 
phenomenon,47 Union citizenship works towards a denationalisation of social rights,48 and their 
(further) rationalisation in legal and economic terms. In this sense, the ‘Europeanisation’ of social 
rights may actually go hand in hand with an ‘economisation’ of what national social rights are all 
about.49 
The right to free movement between European resource and national burden 
The political economy of free movement has changed during the course of the integration process, 
as has the rationale for extending national solidarity to strangers and, just as importantly, for 
limiting it. In the following, we will approach the question of who owes what to whom from the 
viewpoint of what constitutes a ‘burden’ and, eventually, an ‘unreasonable burden’, for national 
welfare systems in the context of the free movement of persons. This terminology recently gained 
currency in EU legal parlance in the context of economically non-actives claiming access to 
national solidarity. It is intricately connected with economic arguments, whereas restricting the 
free movement of economically actives should not be possible on (purely) economic grounds. 
However, extending rights to economically non-actives may have had the counter-intuitive effect 
of restricting those of economically actives. We will first sum up relevant legal developments for 
the core of workers and then turn to recent case-law on economically non-actives. 
                                                          
43 Hager, above, n. 16, at 111; original emphasis; reference omitted. 
44 Ibid., at 110. 
45 This concept is connected with the ‘Third Way’ of ‘New Labour’ in the UK; see, for example, M. Powell, ‘New Labour 
and the Third Way in the British Welfare State: A New and Distinctive Approach?’, (2000) 20 Critical Social Policy, 39-
60. 
46 V. Marotta, ‘Georg Simmel, the Stranger and the Sociology of Knowledge’, (2012) 33 Journal of Intercultural Studies, 
675-689, at 677. 
47 Compared to the society that Simmel described; cf. Simmel, above, n. 10. 
48 D. Friedrich, P. Nanz and K. Blome, ‘Free Movement and the Emergence of Social Citizenship’, (2012) 41 
Österreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft, 383-398, at 395. 
49 On how individualism makes national solidarity appear ’ugly and unkind’, A. Somek, ‘Solidarity Decomposed: Being 
and Time in European Citizenship’, (2007) 32 European Law Review, 787-818, at 816. 
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Mobile Union citizens as a European resource: establishing the free movement of workers 
In the Spaak Report of 1956,50 which led to the EEC Treaty, we do find a notion of burden in the 
context of the free movement of workers, albeit not with regard to their host Member States but 
to their home Member States, namely those suffering from structural unemployment.51 
Accordingly, the promise of enhanced labour mobility was that ’the unemployed workforce, 
instead of being a burden for some countries, turns into a resource for Europe’.52 Exporting the 
domestic burden – the unemployed – abroad was thus desirable at the outset of the European 
project, even though this was not the only available option.53 
The Regulation on the free movement of workers, issued in 1968,54 and the ‘Coordination 
Regulation’, issued in 1971,55 still reflected the idea of exporting domestic burden, though the 
former also foresaw ‘[m]easures for controlling the balance of the labour market’56 in case of 
serious ‘disturbances.’57 Moreover, its preamble described the freedom as a fundamental right 
and outlined the expected mutual benefits for migrant workers and Member States: ‘mobility of 
labour within the Community must be one of the means by which the worker is guaranteed the 
possibility of improving his living and working conditions and promoting his social advancement, 
while helping to satisfy the requirements of the economies of the Member States’.58 
The Coordination Regulation aimed to guarantee that migrant workers receive their social rights 
and advantages determined by applicable national legislation whilst preventing unjustified 
overlaps. It established a network of competent institutions that in certain situations reimburse 
expenses for paid-out benefits to each other, but did not include any safeguards regarding the 
                                                          
50 ‘Spaak Report’ (full version in French ‘Rapport des chefs de délégation aux ministres des affaires etrangères’, Comité 
Intergouvernemental créé par la conférence de Messine, Secrétariat, Bruxelles, 1956, available at 
http://aei.pitt.edu/996/1/Spaak_report_french.pdf. 
51 Among the six founding Members of the EEC this was, as we have seen, first of all Italy. Cf. W. Molle and A. v. 
Mourik, ‘International Movements of Labour under Conditions of Economic Integration: The Case of Western Europe’, 
(1988) 26 Journal of Common Market Studies, 317-342, at 322-323. 
52 Spaak Report, above, n. 50, at 18; our translation. 
53 According to the theory of international trade, ‘a country where labour is abundant and hence cheap, might just as 
well import capital and export labour as export labour-intensive goods’; see Molle and v. Mourik, above, n. 51, at 329. 
The then Vice-President of the Commission opined that ‘[i]t is for capital to go where there is labour and not vice 
versa’; see Levi-Sandri, above, n. 29, at 6. 
54 Council Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 of the Council of 15 October 1968 on freedom of movement for workers 
within the Community (replaced by Regulation (EU) No 492/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
5 April 2011 on freedom of movement for workers within the Union (OJ L 141, 27.5.2011, p. 1-12). 
55 Council Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 of 14 June 1971 on the application of social security schemes to employed 
persons, to self-employed persons and to members of their families moving within the Community (OJ, English Special 
Edition 1971 (II), p. 416), as amended and updated by Council Regulation (EC) No 118/97 of 2 December 1996 (OJ 
1997 L 28, p. 1) (replaced by Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 
2004 on the coordination of social security systems (OJ L 166, 30.4.2004, p. 1-99) which entered into force in 2010). 
56 Reg. 1612/68, above, n. 54, sub-heading of Title III. 
57 Ibid., Art. 20(1). 
58 Third recital of the preamble to Reg. 1612/68, above, n. 54; emphasis added. Post-Single European Act, possibly a 
reading in light of the state of evolution of EU law at that point, AG Jacobs’s interpretation of the same recital in Case 
344/87 Bettray, EU:C:1989:113, point 29, is: ‘The recital makes it clear that labour is not, in Community law, to be 
regarded as a commodity and notably gives precedence to the fundamental rights of workers over satisfying the 
requirements of the economies of the Member States.’; emphasis added. 
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balancing or burdening of the finances of the host Member State. In line with the non-
discrimination provisions of the Treaty, those within the scope of its application ‘shall be subject to 
the same obligations and enjoy the same benefits […] as the nationals of the State’.59 
Hence, at its inception, the free movement of workers was premised on the fact that ‘the labour 
market was tight in all Member States except Italy’.60 In fact, intra-EU migration was far from 
sufficient to satisfy the demand for labour in the receiving Member States. This changed with the 
economic crisis of the 1970s, which led to a change in national migration policies. Not unlike 
today, ‘economic factors’ were reinforced by ‘socio-cultural factors’ related to ‘feelings of 
Ueberfremdung’ (over-exposure to foreigners), with the effect being a considerable decline in the 
total numbers of foreign workers, including third-country nationals, in the six founding Member 
States: ‘from nearly 4.5 million to 3.3 million from 1974 to 1984’.61 However, despite higher levels 
of unemployment across Europe and increasing disparities in the enlarged Community from the 
early-1970s onwards, mobile workers remained a privileged group in the free movement of 
persons, some national policy fluctuation notwithstanding. 
In light of secondary EU legislation, of both then and now, workers are quite obviously considered 
a resource rather than a burden for the host Member States. Workers’ privileges were confirmed 
in Directive 2004/3862 as it excludes them from the scope of burdening analysis and economic 
grounds as reason for their expulsion. What EU law determines as a worker – a resource – has not, 
according to case-law and literature, required the worker to make a positive net contribution – or 
any income tax contribution – to the host Member State’s public finances.63 
The fundamentally positive assessment of incoming workers is also reflected in recent case-law, 
which refers back to the above-mentioned passage in the preamble of the 1968 Regulation when 
it analyses the appropriateness, or not, of a residence requirement for establishing a ‘sufficient 
link of integration’ between the (partially) migrant worker and the host Member State. However, 
in assessing justification for (un)equal treatment of workers, the Court specifically suggests this 
link ‘arises from, inter alia, the fact that, through the taxes which he pays in the host Member 
State by virtue of his employment, the migrant worker also contributes to the financing of the 
social policies of that State and should profit from them under the same conditions as national 
workers’.64 Accordingly, ‘migrant workers and frontier workers’ can expect in return for their 
contributions – work and taxes – to the host Member State the same solidarity – social and tax 
                                                          
59 Art. 3(1) Reg. 1408/71, Case 82/86 Laborero and Sabato, EU:C:1987:356. 
60 Molle and v. Mourik, above, n. 51, at 322.  
61 Ibid., at 325. 
62 Dir. 2004/38 above, n. 4. 
63 Case 53/81 Levin, EU:C:1982:105, paras 15-17; Case 139/85 Kempf, EU:C:1986:223, para. 14; and Case 196/87 
Steymann, EU:C:1988:475. Recently, see F. de Witte, Justice in the EU: the emergence of transnational solidarity 
(Oxford University Press, 2015), at 87, and A. Iliopoulou-Penot ‘Deconstructing the former edifice of Union citizenship? 
The Alimanovic judgment’, (2016) 53 Common Market Law Review, 1007-1036, at 1021. On the ‘inevitability’ of 
problems of application emerging from the underdefined – by the Court – EU concept of worker, see S. O’Leary, ‘Free 
Movement of Persons and Services’ in P. Craig and G. de Búrca (eds), above, n. 2, 499-545, at 527, and Case C-14/09 
Genc, EU:C:2010:57. 
64 Case C-542/09 Commission v The Netherlands, EU:C:2012:346, paras 63-67. 
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advantages – as national workers and resident workers. However, several judgments also suggest 
that frontier workers’ right to equal treatment can be more easily curbed than resident workers’.65 
In a case concerning the right of a frontier worker’s child to student aid in the parents’ Member 
State of work, the Court states in the abstract that ‘the frontier worker is not always integrated in 
the Member State of employment in the same way as a worker who is resident in that State’ while 
finding this would be a disproportionate conclusion in the case at hand.66 Nonetheless, a formal 
residence requirement is considered ‘too exclusive in nature’ to determine who has access to 
nationally organised solidarity and who has not.67 
Mobile Union citizens as a national burden: economic rationalisation of transnational solidarity 
Extending the right to free movement to economically non-active Member State nationals 
preceded the Maastricht Treaty by only half a year.68 Preambles of those Directives introduced the 
notion that ‘beneficiaries of the right of residence must not become an unreasonable burden on 
the public finances of the host Member State’, and Articles required the beneficiaries to have 
‘sufficient resources to avoid becoming a burden on the social assistance system of the host 
Member State during their period of residence’.69 The entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty not 
only constitutionalised the right to free movement of all Member State nationals (achieving the 
aim set in 1957 of free movement of persons) but also stipulated on a general level that Union 
citizenship was subject to the ‘limitations and conditions’ of primary or secondary EU law.70 A 
clash between the new rights-based EU regime and the leave-based national migration regimes 
was heightened by a debate over whether the new primary law could confer direct effect, the 
need to reinterpret the secondary law issued prior to Treaty changes in accordance with it, and at 
times the perplexing reasoning of the Court.71  
Post-Maastricht, the Court in Grzelczyk interpreted Union citizenship as the fundamental status of 
Member State nationals to require ‘a certain degree of financial solidarity between nationals of a 
host Member State and nationals of other Member States’, allowing economically non-actives to 
burden host Member State public finances, or the social assistance system, to some extent but not 
too much.72 Grzelczyk, Bidar and Trojani together with Baumbast form the post-Maastricht 
                                                          
65 The case-law addressing this situation, engaging the Coordination Regulation and involving exportability of special 
non-contributory benefits, developed rather late, in 2007, that is, after the case-law allowing for objectively justified 
restrictions to the equal treatment of the mobile economically non-active and work-seekers had emerged. Case C-
212/05 Hartmann, EU:C:2007:437 , Case C-213/05 Geven, EU:C:2007:438, and Case C-287/05 Hendrix, EU:C:2007:494. 
66 Case C-20/12 Giersch, EU:C:2013:411, para. 65.  
67 See also Case C-379/11 Caves Krier Frères Sàrl, EU:C:2012:798, para. 53; Case C-220/12 Thiele Meneses, 
EU:C:2013:683, para. 40. 
68 Council Directives 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC, and 90/366/EEC (replaced by 93/96/EEC), all of 28 June 1990, on the 
right of residence, the right of residence for employees and self-employed persons who have ceased their 
occupational activity, and the right of residence for students, respectively (OJ 1990 L 180, p. 26; OJ 1990 L 180, p. 28; 
and OJ 1990 L 180, p. 30, its replacement, of 18 December 1993, OJ 1993 L 317, p. 59). 
69 Emphasis added. 
70 Art. 21(1) TFEU. 
71 J. Shaw and N. Miller ‘When Legal Worlds Collide: An Exploration of What Happens When EU Free Movement Law 
Meets UK Immigration Law’, (2013) 38 European Law Review, 137-166. See also S. Sankari, European Court of Justice 
Legal Reasoning in Context (Europa Law Publishing, 2013).  
72 Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk, EU:C:2001:458, paras 44 and 31. 
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baseline of legal interpretation: only unreasonable burdening was considered a legitimate ground 
for the host Member State to end lawful residence which in turn ended the right to equal 
treatment;73 although this and more recent case-law both state that ‘[i]n any event, the limitations 
and conditions which are referred to in Article [21 TFEU] and laid down by Directive 90/364 are 
based on the idea that the exercise of the right of residence of citizens of the Union can be 
subordinated to the legitimate interests of the Member States.’74 This implies a balancing exercise 
between the legitimate financial interests of the host Member States and the ‘conditional’ right to 
free movement conferred by the Treaty.75 The difference between ‘unreasonable burden’ and 
‘burden’ is retained in the current Directive.76 This may well be on purpose, as the legislator did 
choose to converge the reference point of what is burdened into the narrower notion of ‘social 
assistance system’, while omitting the more general reference to the ‘public finances’ of the host 
Member States. 
Yet recent case-law (2011–) seems to have reached a ‘tipping point’ in how this balance is struck: 
Shuibhne speaks of ‘a profound shift in emphasis towards the rising significance of conditions and 
limits, and a less explicit but discernible ascension of duties, in the application and interpretation 
of citizenship rights’,77 evident in Dano.78 Spelling out the implications of the ‘limitations and 
conditions’ of the right to free movement for economically non-active Union citizens leads to the 
accentuation of individual duties, such as the ‘obligation or responsibility’ to have sufficient 
resources.79 Inasmuch as the change of emphasis in recent case-law reflects the political, or 
popular, concern that economically non-actives are indeed not active enough and, at worst, ‘have 
no intention of being so and deliberately abuse Union law’,80 it is in line with the thinking behind 
the ‘new welfare contract’. Especially Ziolkowski and Szeja and Alimanovic can be read in a similar 
light.81 While the right to rely on Article 18 TFEU (prohibiting discrimination on grounds of 
nationality) is still dependent on lawfulness of residence, like in the baseline case-law, the present 
conception of the concept of lawful residence is different. According to Spaventa, this means that 
                                                          
73 Ibid., para. 42, Case C-456/02, Trojani, EU:C:2004:488, para. 45 and Case C-209/03 Bidar, EU:C:2005:169, para. 47. 
74 Case C-413/99 Baumbast and R, EU:C:2002:493, para. 90; emphasis added. See also Case C-200/02 Zhu and Chen, 
EU:C:2004:639, para. 32 and Case C-408/03 Commission v Belgium, EU:C:2006:192, paras 37 and 41. Recently, see 
Case C-140/12 Brey, EU:C:2013:565, para. 55. 
75 E.g. Case C-356/98 Kaba, EU:C:2000:200, para. 30; Joined cases C-482/01 and C-493/01 Orfanopoulos and Oliveri, 
EU:C:2004:262, para. 47; and Case C-406/04 De Cuyper, EU:C:2006:491, para. 36. The bridge between qualifying a 
right as not unconditional and the wording of Article 21(1) TFEU (referring to ‘limitations and conditions’) was 
semiotic, instead of doctrinal. 
76 On the German language version of Dir. 2004/38, above, n. 4, omitting ‘burden’ entirely and hence alternatively not 
allowing any recourse to social assistance, see D. Thym, ‘The Elusive Limits of Solidarity: Residence Rights of and Social 
Benefits for Economically Inactive Union Citizens’, (2015) 52 Common Market Law Review, 17–50, at 26. 
77 Shuibhne, above, n. 37, at 891. 
78 Case C-333/13 Dano, EU:C:2014:2358. 
79 Shuibhne, above, n. 37, at 901; emphasis omitted. 
80 Ibid., at 936. 
81 Joined cases C-424/10 and C-425/10 Ziolkowski and Szeja, EU:C:2011:866, paras 46-47; Case C-333/13 Dano 
EU:C:2014:2358 paras 69-73; Case C-299/14 García-Nieto and Others EU:C:2016:114 paras 38 and 50; and Case C-
67/14 Alimanovic EU:C:2015:597, para. 49, are central for the stricter reading as to compliance with conditions of Art 
7(1) of Dir. 2004/38, above, n. 4, and thereby to lawful residence. See also D. Thym, ‘When Union Citizens Turn Into 
Illegal Migrants: The Dano Case’, (2015) 40 European Law Review, 249-262, at 253. 
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‘the Court has become more sensitive to the political compromise made in Directive 2004/38, a 
compromise which clearly excluded a meaningful notion of transnational solidarity beyond the 
internal market’.82 
Criticism against the Court is mounting. De Witte finds that the Court has not consistently followed 
any type of transnational solidarity in elaborating norms of justice.83 Moreover, as Davies has put 
it: ‘the asymmetry between the capacity of the Court to present the underlying values and vision 
of this part of EU law so powerfully, and its inability to articulate or recognise the underlying 
values and visions of national measures when these are challenged, is striking’.84 Yet, as the case-
law on mobile students illustrates, the genuine link or sufficient degree of integration, besides 
prior residence, could be borne by ‘the nationality of the student, his schooling, family, 
employment, language skills or the existence of other social and economic factors’, which 
explicitly includes ‘the employment of the family members on whom the student depends’, that is, 
their economic contribution to the benefit-providing Member State.85 Hence, surprisingly or not, it 
all comes down to work and taxes again. 
Directive 2004/38 is formally, not substantively, a remedy for the sector-by-sector piecemeal 
approach of secondary legislation, by collecting the relevant provisions into one more 
encompassing instrument. Though the Court long managed to maintain a seemingly coherent 
body of case-law in terms of the relationship between primary and secondary EU law, its rhetoric 
and strategic manipulation of recent cases is raising doubts about the legitimacy of its 
interpretations in the legal community86 and, arguably, also in the constituency of the Court. In 
Davies’s words: ‘The social legitimacy that citizenship case-law lends to the EU in some groups 
may be more than matched by alienation that it will inspire in others.’87 Be this as it may, our main 
point is that what started out as an exercise of reviewing access to national welfare for the 
economically non-actives has reached the ‘economically actives’ as well. 
Present developments build on how the Court has deferentially assessed the lawful residence of 
non-actives, real links of mobile students or frontier workers, and not addressed mobile atypical or 
part-time workers,88 all of which has left national courts and legislators leeway in defining who 
                                                          
82 E. Spaventa, ‘Citizenship: Reallocating Welfare Responsibilities to the State of Origin’ in P. Koutrakos, N. N. 
Shuibhne, and P. Syrpis (eds) Exceptions from EU Free Movement Law: Derogations, Justifications and Proportionality 
(Hart Publishing, 2016) 32-51, at 51. 
83 De Witte, above, n. 63, at 10-12. 
84 G. Davies, ‘Democracy and Legitimacy in the Shadow of Purposive Competence’, (2015) 21 European Law Journal, 
2–22, at 20. 
85 Case C-359/113 Martens, EU:C:2015:118, para. 41. 
86 See case-comments and other literature addressing the Court cited above and below. As to legal change or divisions 
within the Court, after all these years of interpreting legislation applicable to mobile students, the outcomes of the AG 
and the Court differ in, e.g., ibid., Case C-158/07 Förster, EU:C:2008:630, Case C-73/08 Bressol, EU:C:2010:181, and 
Case C-20/12 Giersch, EU:C:2013:411. 
87 Davies, above, n. 84, at 20. See also S. Currie, ‘The Transformation of Union Citizenship’ in M. Dougan and S. Currie 
50 Years of the European Treaties (Hart Publishing, 2009), M. Dougan, ‘The Bubble that Burst: Exploring the Legitimacy 
of the Case Law on the Free Movement of Union citizens’ in M. Adams et. al. (eds) Judging Europe’s Judges: The 
Legitimacy of the Case Law of the European Court of Justice (Hart Publishing, 2013), 127-154, at 153. 
88 See Shuibhne, above, n. 37, Šadl and Madsen, above, n. 12, and C. O’Brien ’Civis Capitalist Sum: Class as the New 
Guiding Principle of EU Free Movement Rights’, (2016) 53 Common Market Law Review, 937-978. 
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qualifies as worker.89 The logic behind the primarily national restrictive approach is difficult to pin 
down with precision, especially by using the narrow economic terms or arguments the Court 
engages with in reviewing the acceptability and rationality of national measures from an EU law 
perspective. Our guess is that it is a combination of the effects of workfare, which concerns non-
contributory in-work benefits as much as non-contributory out-of-work benefits,90 together with 
competitive pressure exerted on national workers by mobile EU workers under conditions of 
national treatment91 – yet any such rationale remains insufficiently quantified and theorised. 
Whatever the rationale, it appears to be bringing the (de)commodification development mapped 
out above full circle. Present reality seems to exclude transnational solidarity also in part within 
the internal market, not just outside it. What is more, national law recoupling market performance 
with access to the welfare system seems to comply, more than expected, with EU law’s 
requirements.92 Hence the present situation seems more reminiscent of the “safety valve” and 
‘labour market disturbance’ logic found in the 1968 Regulation on the free movement of 
workers,93 than of the period immediately prior to lifting the remaining transitional restrictions on 
workers after EU’s eastern enlargement. In fact, contrary to what AG Jacobs argued in 1989, 
labour seems to be a commodity and precedence is given to its ‘helping to satisfy the 
requirements of the economies of the Member States’94 over workers’ rights.95 A gaping hole has 
therefore appeared, or become visible, in the legally organised form of transnational solidarity. 
 
The UK example and the Brexit debate: solidifying the paradigm shift? 
The question of who owes what to whom in the transnational setting of Union citizenship gained 
high profile in the ‘Brexit debate’. The British renegotiation agenda which the UK presented to the 
European Council meeting of 18-19 February 2016 found support in all European leaders. The 
suggested reforms aimed to limit access to certain non-contributory in-work benefits to (resident) 
mobile EU nationals working in the UK, and thus went to the heart of the free movement of 
                                                          
89 According to information collected from FreSsco’s (Free Movement and Social Security Network for the European 
Commission) national experts, many Member States apply an expansive understanding of what is considered marginal 
and ancillary work – or, in the obverse, a narrow worker definition – meaning that though they are working, they are 
considered economically non-active, see O’Brien, Spaventa and De Coninck, The Concept of Worker under Article 45 
TFEU and Certain Non-standard Forms of Employment, (2016) FreSsco Comparative Report 2015, available at 
www.ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=15476&langId=en. 
90 Both types of benefits can be instrumentalised to increase labour market participation, at the price of creating a 
class of ‘working poor’. (See also O’Brien, above n. 88, at 939.) In Peck’s terms, ‘[u]nder conditions of wage stagnation, 
growing underemployment, and job casualization, workfarism maximizes (and effectively mandates) participation in 
contingent, low-paid work by churning workers back into the bottom of the labor market’; see Peck, above, n. 40, at 
80; reference omitted. For a short note on the EU, see J. F. Handler, ‘Welfare, Workfare, and Citizenship in the 
Developed World’, (2009) 5 Annual Review of Law and Social Science, 71-90, at 87. 
91 A. Saydé, Freedom as a Source of Constraint: Expanding Market Discipline Through Free Movement, EUI Working 
Paper LAW 2015/42, at 19, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2728673. 
92 Case C-308/14 Commission v UK, EU:C:2016:436. 
93 Reg. 1612/68, above, n. 54. 
94 Ibid., third recital of the preamble to Reg. 1612/68. 
95 See AG Jacobs, above, n. 58. 
 15 
persons. More specifically, two measures were sought: first, the option of a ban on (or indexing of) 
exportable child benefits and, second, the option of resorting to a safeguard mechanism that 
would, in exceptional circumstances, allow for a limited period of time to restrict workers’ access 
to non-contributory in-work benefits to the extent considered necessary.96 To facilitate Prime 
Minister Cameron’s campaign for the UK’s continued membership in the EU, the European Council 
Conclusions contain commitments to change secondary legislation in order to accommodate these 
requests.97  
The (domestic) Brexit-discussion focused on low-paid workers from other Member States and 
side-lined mobility of economically non-actives as financially a secondary issue. The novelty here is 
not that restricting free movement struck a chord with national leaders who make up the 
(European) Council,98 however, what is new is that the suggested move would close access to the 
UK welfare system for all new mobile EU workers. As the votes in the referendum on the UK’s EU 
membership on 23 June 2016 were in favour of British withdrawal from the EU, that offer is off the 
table. 
What is more, the UK position on habitual residence, that is, the test that withstood the 
Commission’s infringement action on it roughly a week before the referendum,99 is an effective 
way of nationally defining the boundaries of the welfare state, and hence can be used for curbing 
transnational solidarity. This test that in effect decides whether or not one has access to national 
social security (e.g., child benefits and child tax credits) includes in the evaluation one’s ‘degree of 
attachment and intention to remain in the UK’ and requires that the length of residence is not 
determinate.100 It seems safe to say that tests of this type will not disappear from but instead 
proliferate in other Member States as well. Several Member States have continued interest in 
restricting mobile workers’ access to child benefits when their families do not move with or follow 
                                                          
96 European Council Conclusions (18 and 19 February 2016, EUCO 12/16), available at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/02/19-euco-conclusions/, at 23. The safeguard 
mechanism would require amending Reg. 492/2011 (above, n. 54) which in turn would allow suspending mobile 
Member State workers’ access to non-contributory in-work benefits for their four first years in the UK, during a seven 
year safeguard period. Commission Declaration annexed (Annex VI) to the same Conclusions states that ‘present 
circumstances in the UK qualify as exceptional’, allowing the triggering of the safeguard mechanism at the UK’s 
request. On the absence of data on the circumstances (i.e., in terms of both revenue and expenditure), see Iliopoulou-
Penot, above, n. 63, at 1029. 
97 The wording of the Declaration of the European Commission (Annex V) in the 18-19 February 2016 European 
Council Conclusions is somewhat unclear (‘option to index such benefits to the conditions of the Member State where 
the child resides’) as to whether child benefits would be indexed at the level of local cost of living or to match the local 
level of child benefits in amending Reg. 883/2004. Indexing would have applied to new claims with immediate effect, 
but could have been extended to all claims from 1 January 2020. Interestingly, the same Conclusions clearly state that 
the ‘Commission does not intend to propose that the future system of optional indexation of child benefits be 
extended to other types of exportable benefits, such as old-age pensions’ (at 22). 
98 See, e.g., Letter by the Ministers of the Interior Mikl-Leitner, Friedrich, Teeven and May addressed to the President 
of the European Council for Justice and Home Affairs Shatter, April 2013. 
99 Case C-308/14 Commission v UK, EU:C:2016:436. 
100 Review of the Balance of Competences between the United Kingdom and the European Union – Single Market: Free 
Movement of Persons, 2014, available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/335088/SingleMarketFree_Movem
entPersons.pdf, at 20. 
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the worker to the host Member State.101 Further rescaling is, as well, underway with regard to 
non-workers. For example, the German government recently passed a law stipulating that job-
seekers from other Member States would no longer gain access to social assistance after six 
months of residence, as the Federal Social Court had ruled a year before, but only after five 
years.102 
Drawing on the prototypes, or stereotypes, of migrant workers in postwar Belgium and today’s 
UK, we can contrast the Italian steel worker of the Spaak Report with the Polish construction 
worker103 lurking behind the Brexit debate. Whereas the former was considered a resource for 
Europe, the latter is increasingly considered a burden by the host Member State. In Simmel’s 
account of the stranger, because the stranger is not ‘organically connected’ to the group he or she 
is living in, the relation to him or her is of a ‘more abstract nature’.104 In practice, the presence of 
the stranger has goaded the host Member State to rationalise and objectify its social system in 
relation to nationals and migrants alike. In this sense, the ‘Polish plumber’ exerts disciplining 
effects not only on the national labour market,105 but also on the system of nationally organised 
solidarity, changing it from within. Residence requirements, like the ‘habitual residence test’, take 
a different route, presuming that the stranger is not settling down but soon leaving again. 
                                                          
101 The option to index child benefits, as envisioned in the European Council Conclusions, above, n. 96 and n. 97, was 
favourably commented on, amongst others, by the German chancellor towards the end of the summit, see P. 
Oltermann, ‘Germany Among EU Countries Keen To Copy UK Child Benefit Peg’, The Guardian, 23 February 2016, 
available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/23/germany-angela-merkel-eu-countries-keen-copy-uk-
child-benefit-peg. Eight months after the Brexit referendum, whose negative outcome nullified this provision, three 
Austrian ministers urged in a letter to the President of the EU Commission to put the option to index child benefits 
back on the European agenda, as was reported by the Austria Presse Agentur on 14 November 2016, which had 
received a copy of the letter. 
102 See the decision of the Federal Social Court (Bundessozialgericht) of 3 December 2015, B 4 AS 44/15 R, available in 
German at http://juris.bundessozialgericht.de/cgi-bin/rechtsprechung/list.py?Gericht=bsg&Art=en, as well as the 
draft law of the German government, Drucksache 18/10211 (7 November 2016) and the recommendation for a 
decision and the report of the responsible parliamentary committee, Drucksache 18/10518 (30 November 2016), 
available in German at http://pdok.bundestag.de/index.php. The German parliament approved the amended draft law 
on 1 December 2016. 
103 A. Spigelman, ‘The Depiction of Polish Migrants in the United Kingdom by the British Press After Poland’s Accession 
to the European Union’, (2013) 33 International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy, 98-113. 
104 Simmel, above, n. 10, at 404 and 406 (emphasis omitted). 
105 Cf. A. Saydé, above, n. 91, who distinguishes between a ‘mutual-recognition plumber’ and a ‘national-treatment 
plumber’. 
